CONCLUSIONS
Results of the dose rate computations show that for all three enrichmentsources evaluated, more than 5 mradh1 of neutronradiationwould be present at heights from 1 meter out to 100 meters.
The criticality accident alarm detectorset point is 5 mrad ht. Consequently, all positions within this radius would meet the requirements set forth by the ANSI standard. All of the detectors currently in position in Buildings X-326, X-330, and X-333 are within this 100 meter range from any possible criticality event within the building (Table 1) .
The model used in this analysis is identical to that used in earlier analyses. These earlier analyses showed that the currentlocation of the criticality alarm system would respond to a minimum accident of concern.
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INTRODUCTION
This analysis was performed to determine whether or not the neutron detectors present in the X-326, X-330 and X-333 process buildings could be lowered from their currentheight of 5 meters to a lower height of 1 meter and still be responsive to a minimum accident of concern (Ref. 1). These neutron detectors are located above the cells that comprise the cascade diffusion plant and are accessible by catwalks and ladders.
Relocating the detectors could reduce the potential for worker injury when the approximately90 pound alarms need to be removed for periodic maintenance. It could also decrease the incidence of battery failure from elevated temperatures which can exceed 160 degrees F. At the proposed 1-meter elevation the detectors would be surrounded by the cells containing the cascade equipment; therefore, the detectors would be less responsive to a criticality event.
The criticality alarm system must be able to respond to the ANSI minimum accident of concern. ANSI Standard ANS-8.3-1986, "Criticality Accident Alarm System," provides guidance for the establishment and maintenance of systems in facilities engaged in the processing of fissionable materials (Ref. 2). Section 5.6 of the standard addresses the question of the minimum accident of concern.
5.6. Detection Criterion. Criticality alarm systems shall be designed to detect immediately the minimum accident of concern. For this purpose, in areas where material is handled or processed with only nominal shielding, the minimum accident may be assumed to deliver the equivalent of an absorbed dose hi free air of 20 rad at a distance of 2 meters from the reaction material in 60 s. The alarm signal shall activate promptly when the dose rate at the detectors equals or exceeds a value equivalent to 20 rad rain"1at 2 meters from the reacting material.
This detection criterion establishes the reference criticality incident used for this study. In terms of average dose rate, the criticality event generates 1,200 rad h1 of
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combined neutron aridphoton absorbed dose at positions 2 meters from the surface of the critical volume.
Another important consideration addressed by the standard is the ability of the detection system to avoid false alarms from background radiation through the use of appropriate discriminator trip point settings.
5.7.2. To minimize false alarms, the trip point may be set in the rad h"lrange as long as the criterion of 5.6 is met. The alarm trip point of the rate sensing device should be more than 10 mrad h"1above normal or operational background at the monitoring point.
The neutron backgroundradiation levels within the cascade process buildings are less than 0.1 mradh"1. An alarm set point of 5 mradh"lis used at the Portsmouth facility.
There have not been any false criticality alarms at the Portsmouth facility as a result of high backgroundradiation.
A thirdfactor in the evaluation of the criticality alarmsystem is the shielding effect of process equipmentlocated between the radiation source and the detectors. The location and _ing addressedin Section 5.8 of the ANSI standard. Nevertheless, in order to provide maximum flexibility in enrichmentoperations and storage of fissile heavy materials, criticality alarm coverage is provided for all of the process buildings. Thus it is assumed that an accidental criticality could occur anywhere within these buildings.
Since there is no fixed position for a potential criticality, the maximum distance to the nearest detector from any position must be determined. A key assumption used for this analysis is that all the detectors are equally sensitive, and that there is no angular dependance in detectorsensitivity. Table 1 lists the maximumdistances for all detectors to potential critical sources in buildings X-326, X-330 and X-333 (Refs. 7-11). Due to the location of the detectors, no criticality accident can occur at a distance of more than 100 meters from any detector. Therefore, dose calculations at 100 meters from the detectors (at 5 meter and 1 meter heights) were used to evaluate whether the minimum accident of concern can be detected regardless of where it occurs within the buildings. Table 2 lists the neutron source strengths corresponding to critical power levels used in this investigation for each of the three sources. These values were used in converting the cell average fluxes from units of "per starting partielC to actual flux units of n cm2 seel.
Note that for increasing enrichment, the source strength decreases. The radiationsource is located on the model centerline at a height of 108 cm (91.5 cm above the floor) approximatingthe height of a container which would hold the UO2F2-H20 solution. Table 3 lists the neutronleakage spectranormalizedto one neutron. This is the same 27-group source used in the earlier DOT-IV analysis. The resultantfluxes and correspondingdoses tallied by the MCNP runs also correspond to this 27-group structure.
The number densities of the elements used to make up the 5 materials employed in the model are listed in Table 4 . All of the materialinside the cell housings (equipment, structuralmembers, etc.) has been homogenized to give the most conservative intervening
shielding. This includes all tools, machinery, structuraland other material normally located in an average cell. There is no fissile material present in the model. Consequently, all neutrons trackedin the model originate from the source (i.e., critical assembly) which is treated as a point. ii iii "" i Represents lower energy limit to the set, In order to obtain dose rates to within 5 percent relative error 500,000 particle histories were run. Such a large number was required in order to obtain enough collisions in the cells farthestaway from the source.
Z (m) 
RESULTS
The values obtained for the dose rates at selected positions are listed in Table 5 .
Alongwitheachvalueis theaccompanying relative error(1_). Therelativeerroris a function of the number of historiesrun,as wellas distance of the editto the source.
The dose rate value at each position decreases with increasing enrichment. This is due to the higher source strength at critical for each enrichment. According to Table 2 , the lower enrichment source produces more neutrons per second than the higher enrichment source. Table 3 . The spl card contains the source probability distributionfor the corresponding enrichment, listed in Table 3 . These values are unique for each enrichment. The era4 cardcontains the group-wise flux to dose response functions for the energy group structureof the e4 card. These values are the response functions 0isted in AppendixB), multiplied by the source strength (listed in Table 2 ), multiplied by the conversion factors of 3,600 sech "1,and 103mradtad-1. The fc4 tally comment card has been utilized to indicate in the outputfile that the f4 tatlies have been modified by a response function, and the units of mrad h_ are printed.
Of particular importanceto this investigation is the neutron importancecard (imp:n).
These entries assign weight windows to the surfaces of each cell in order to balance the neutron populationbetween the source and the detector positions. This must be achieved to assure accuracy of the solution, for informationonce lost in transportcannot be regained.
The importanceslisted in the imp:n card balance the neutron population throughoutthe problem assuring adequatedetectorstatistics. The dose rate values compare to within a difference of less than 4 percent out to 100 meters, which correspondsto the maximumdistance of a potential criticality to the nearest neutron detector. All conclusions drawnin this report are made from calculations within 100 meters from the critical source.
MCNP predicts higher dose rate values past 100 meters, by more than 50 percent at 138 meters. This is possibly due to the handling of the ray effects associated with scattering.
The effect is undoubtedlypronounceddue to the greater distance from the source. However, these differences do not have any effect on the conclusions drawn on the calculations out to 100 meters. 
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